The Quest for a Supranational Entity in West Africa: Can the Economic Community of West African States attain the Status? by Lokulo-Sodipe, Jadesola O & Osuntogun, Abiodun J
  
ISSN 1727-3781 
 
Authors: JO Lokulo-Sodipe  
and AJ Osuntogun 
 
 
THE QUEST FOR A SUPRANATIONAL ENTITY IN WEST AFRICA: 
CAN THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES 
ATTAIN THE STATUS? 
 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v16i3.9 
2013 VOLUME 16 No 3 
JO LOKULO-SODIPE AND AJ OSUNTOGUN  PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
 
255 / 392 
THE QUEST FOR A SUPRANATIONAL ENTITY IN WEST AFRICA: CAN THE 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES ATTAIN THE STATUS? 
 
JO Lokulo-Sodipe* 
AJ Osuntogun** 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The importance of institutions as a tool for states to surmount the national, regional 
and international challenges that face them cannot be over-emphasised. However, it 
is necessary to examine the system which a particular institution adopts to achieve 
its objectives.  
 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established on 28 
May 19751 to promote economic cooperation within the region.2 It adopted at its 
inception an intergovernmental approach to governance, creating an institution with 
a regional economic system based on national sovereignty and non-interference in 
the affairs of its member states.3  
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toro_jade@yahoo.com. 
**  Abiodun J Osuntogun. LLB (University of Lagos), LLM (Obafemi Awolowo University Ile–Ife), MA 
(University of Ibadan), LLM (University of Pretoria), CILS (American University Washington DC). 
Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. E-mail: osunfolak@yahoo.com. The 
authors are grateful to Professor Kofi Oteng Kufuor for his comments on an earlier version of the 
article and for the anonymous reviewers' comments.   
1  ECOWAS comprises of 15 members due to the withdrawal of Mauritania. They are Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.  
2  Article 2(1) of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (1975) (hereinafter 
the ECOWAS Treaty) sets out the aims and objectives of the community as follows: "... to 
promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in all fields of 
industry, transport, telecommunication, energy, agriculture, natural sciences, commerce, 
monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the 
standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability of fostering 
closer relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the 
African continent."  
3  Kufuor Institutional Transformation 30. Kufuor Institutional Transformation 30 explains the 
intergovernmental nature of the ECOWAS Treaty as: "... under the 1975 Treaty, the sovereignty 
of the members was left intact. As a result, there was only a general undertaking in the Treaty 
that all the members of the community in planning and directing their national policies would do 
so with the aims of the ECOWAS in mind".  
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However, due to the failure of ECOWAS to achieve its objectives, a Committee of 
Eminent Persons (the CEP) was established to examine the reasons behind its failure 
and to make recommendations for its reform "in order to accelerate the integration 
process and contribute effectively to West African development".4 
 
The major recommendation of the CEP was that the intergovernmental system of 
the 1975 treaty should be jettisoned and a supranational system adopted.5 The 
aftermath of the report was the Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West 
African States of 1993,6 which attempted to turn ECOWAS into a supranational 
institution.  
 
This article discusses the issue of the supranational status of ECOWAS. The article 
consists of six parts. The first part is an introduction, while the second part examines 
the reasons behind the quest for supranational status. Part three highlights the steps 
that the community has taken so far to achieve supranational status. A critique of 
supranationalism with a discourse on its advantages and disadvantages is dealt with 
in part four. Part five examines whether or not ECOWAS can really become a 
supranational entity, and the conclusion is given in part six.  
 
2 Why the new structure? 
 
ECOWAS has been in existence for almost thirty-eight years (from May 1975 to 
date). It has faced challenges in the process of implementing its treaties as well as 
inevitable obstacles and setbacks on the road to co-operation and integration. A 
feeling of dissatisfaction as to its performance permeated the entire period of thirty-
eight years.7 
                                                 
4  Kufuor Institutional Transformation 30. 
5  Kufuor Institutional Transformation 36. 
6  Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (1993) (hereafter the Revised 
Treaty). 
7  Nwauche 2011 Journal of African Law 182 stated: "34 years after the formation of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as a regional economic and social community, not 
much has been achieved to realize the community's lofty objectives". 
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Omoniyi8 surveyed public opinion on the issue and came out with a balanced view:  
 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the largest and the 
latest of the communities established in 1975, cannot be said to have met the 
expectations of its founding fathers. It is unfair to write it off as 'non-
operational', as indeed, a number of ministers and officials in some member 
states did in the course of our investigations; but it is true that its impact in their 
economic development of the sub-regions has been marginal. 
 
There are various reasons why ECOWAS could not achieve its aims and objectives 
within the span of thirty-eight years, and most of them have to do with the structure 
of the organisation. 
 
Firstly, it lacks the necessary organ or institution to accomplish its objectives. The 
supreme decision-making power lies with the Authority of Heads of State and 
Government and the secretariat of the community is charged with the task of 
executing the decisions taken by it.9 There is no supranational institution to 
implement the decisions, several of which are important, particularly those relating 
to the promotion of intra-community trade.10 The secretariat has no discretionary 
power to make decision and the parliament is a mere debating gathering for the 
ordinary "ventilation of views".11  
 
The institutions of ECOWAS are inter-governmental by nature, not supranational. 
Supranational institutions are different from intergovernmental institutions. 
Intergovernmental bodies could never grow into an "international integration", but 
supranational institutions, which represent a community of nations, could develop 
into federal systems or confederations and be great facilitators of integration.12 
                                                 
8  Omoniyi "West Africa's Multiple Inter-Governmental Organisations" 20. 
9  Article 19(3)(a) of the Revised Treaty.  
10  Omoniyi "West Africa's Multiple Inter-Governmental Organisations" 20. 
11  See Protocol A/P.2/8/94 Relating to the Community Parliament (1994) (establishing the ECOWAS 
Parliament), which makes the parliament a merely advisory institution. However, a 4(2) of the 
Supplementary Protocol A/SP.3/06/06 (Amending Protocol A/P.2/8/94 Relating to the Community 
Parliament) (2006) (hereinafter the Supplementary Protocol) provides that the parliament 
powers "shall be progressively enhanced from advisory to co-decision making and subsequently 
to a law-making role in areas to be defined by the Authority". 
12  Cheong 2004 East Asian Review 73. 
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Secondly, the degree of commitment of member states to the overall objectives of 
ECOWAS was worrisome. The lack of commitment could be explained from three 
perspectives. The first is that of the financial obligation of members to the 
organisation. To our chagrin, monetary contributions do not flow in as regularly as 
scheduled.13 There was even a time when the executive secretariat of ECOWAS was 
finding it increasingly difficult to pay most of its staff because of the default in the 
payment of contributions by member states.14 Most members failed to honour their 
financial obligations for not just a year but for years.15 There is no doubt that it is 
difficult for a regional organisation to live up to its expectation if the financial 
obligations of its members are not fulfilled. The second is that there is no viable 
commitment to ratify and implement decisions reached by the Authority of Heads of 
State and Government. The Heads of State and Governments come together to take 
decisions on behalf of the community but after decisions are reached they see the 
implication of the decisions as a threat to their national sovereignty and some of 
them renege on their commitment in order to protect their national interest. 
Consequentially, there is a delay in the ratification and implementation of decisions 
and protocols, which constitutes a serious barrier to the effective development of the 
community.16  
 
The consequences of this lack of commitment17 would be destructive to any 
organisation, particularly when the organisation is not empowered to enforce 
                                                 
13  Umozurike Introduction 231.  
14  Nwakile "Degree of Commitment of Member States" 147. 
15  See Jide The Guardian (Nig) 14. 
16  Eventually, when protocols are signed and ratified by members, the members still find a way of 
protecting their national interest by implementing the protocols half-heartedly. For example, 
after the signing of Protocol A/P.1/5/79 Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence 
and Establishment (1979), an agreement on free movement, in compliance with a 3(2), all 
ECOWAS countries abolished visas and entry permit requirements for visits not exceeding 90 
days. In spite of that abolition, which could have been regarded as full compliance with the 
provisions of that section of the article, citizens are still subjected to harassment at the border 
and along the interstate roads of member states, which makes a mockery of the whole exercise. 
The principal programme officer, Immigration, ECOWAS Headquarters, Nfaly said that the failure 
to comply with the protocol on free entry was undermining the influence of the regional body. 
See Michael The Punch (Nig) 19. 
17  For example, when West African countries were opposing the proposed Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) between the European Union and the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), Cote D'Ivore was reported to have signed an interim trade deal. Adeleye 2007 
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compliance with its decisions, as it would be if it were a supranational organisation. 
The only seemingly effective supranational organ in ECOWAS is the community court 
of justice. Under article 76 of the Revised Treaty,18 the court is competent to deal 
with disputes referred to it regarding the interpretation or the application of the 
provisions of the Revised Treaty. 
 
The position of a court in a regional organisation or community of nations with 
regional integration as an objective could not be over-emphasised. It is the court 
that interprets the treaty and monitors the ways in which all institutions have 
observed the treaty. It is the arbiter that redresses the infringement of any rights 
under the treaty. The regional court must therefore be structured in such a way that 
its judgements are enforced.  
 
The problem with the Community's court of justice lies in this area of enforcement. 
ECOWAS does not possess an organ of its own19 which is responsible for the 
enforcement of decisions or the execution of judgments. The possibility of enforcing 
judgments against the members' states is uncertain due to inadequacy of article 
22(3) of the protocol, which merely directs the "Member States and Institutions of 
the Community" to implement them20 without considering situations where the 
judgments to be implemented are not in the interests of those responsible for 
implementing them. As a result, "60 percent of ECOWAS judgments since its 
inception are not enforced".21 We shall say more on this in the next section. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.bit.ly/172frYN: "Cote D'Ivoire may have thrown the camp of Nigeria and other West 
African countries into confusion by signing an interim trade accord with the European Union at 
the weekend. The organised private sector in Nigeria had opposed some of the clauses in the 
trade deal which they feared would hurt local firms and wipe out jobs. In fact the Nigerian 
Minister of Industry, Ogbu, was quoted as saying at a forum last week that government would 
not let the OPS down".  
18  See the ECOWAS Treaty. 
19  Similarly in the EU, community institutions do not possess organs of their own for the 
enforcement of their decisions or the execution of court's judgments. Enforcement is governed 
by the rules of civil procedure in force in the state in whose territory it takes place. 
20  Protocol A/P.1/7/91 Establishing the Community Court of Justice (1991). 
21  News Agency of Nigeria 2012 http://www.bit.ly/183JaSW. 
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The third is that of the divided loyalty of the member states, which are also loyal to 
other inter-governmental organisations apart from the ECOWAS. The ECOWAS 
Commission22 itself recognises this as one of its problem, which it refers to as: 
 
... the multiplicity of organizations for regional integration with the same 
objectives. The multiplicity of Intergovernmental Organizations'23 (IGOs) in West 
Africa contributed in great measure to the slow pace of progress at the 
community. 
 
Ostensibly ECOWAS thinks that accommodating them within the community could 
solve the problem of divided loyalty. It therefore purports to allow member states to 
belong to other economic groupings provided that such membership does not 
"derogate from the obligations of that member state under the treaty".24 But the 
reverse is actually the case, as some organisations like the West African Economic 
and Monetary Zone (WAEMU), whose membership includes the Ivory Coast, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta, stand as rivals to ECOWAS. It is difficult 
if not impossible for a country to be loyal to two organisations with the same 
objectives in the same region. If it were possible it would be at the level of ordinary 
co-operation, but for a country to surrender part of its sovereignty to two 
supranational institutions on the same matter in the same region and for the same 
purpose may be unrealistic and a mirage.25 That is a problem that ECOWAS must 
resolve if the new structure which will transform it into a supranational institution is 
to be accomplished.26  
                                                 
22  ECOWAS 1999 http://www.bit.ly/18ZQVKI. 
23  They are numerous. For example, there are the Organisation for the Development of Senegal 
River, the Mano River Union, the Francophone Economic Community of West Africa (CEAO) etc. 
24  Article 28(3) of the Revised Treaty. 
25  The ECOWAS Council of Ministers appointed an ad hoc committee to look into the possibility of 
harmonising the existing trade liberalisation schemes in the region. The report of the committee, 
which was presented to the 13th session of the Council of Ministers on 7 May 1983 recommended 
"that the objectives of a customs union adopted by ECOWAS should be approved for trade 
liberalisation in West Africa sub-region." The Council accepted this recommendation and further 
recommended to the Authority of Heads of State and Government that a "strong appeal be made 
to the appropriate authorities of CEAO to merge the objectives, aspirations and programmes of 
CEAO with those of ECOWAS with a view to avoiding duplication of efforts and facilitating total 
solidarity towards the creation of the customs union and economic integration envisaged under 
the ECOWAS Treaty."  
26  Once ECOWAS becomes a supranational institution, the other organisations will become 
insignificant unless they too become supranational entities. In such a situation there might be 
conflict of interest.  
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Thirdly, the gradual approach27 to regional integration by the Heads of State and 
Government at the inception of the establishment of ECOWAS was taken to protect 
the interest of member states as well as to allay the fears of each member 
particularly the weak states among them, that their national sovereignty would be 
sacrificed on the altar of the collective will. Consequently the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty 
revolves around economic issues as a means of developing co-operative ties without 
making any provision for security cooperation. The absence of provisions dealing 
with security matters became a problem when a civil war erupted in Liberia during 
the tenure of the then President Doe, which led to the death of many Liberian 
citizens and foreign nationals residing in Liberia. Other countries in West Africa, 
particularly those under the aegis of ECOWAS, were unable in law to intervene, 
although many of their citizens were being killed during the war.  
 
Therefore, at the 13th Summit of ECOWAS in Banjul, the Gambia, it was agreed that 
a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) should be set up. When the civil war failed 
to abate the SMC established an ECOWAS Peace Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) with a 
mandate to restore peace and separate the warring factions.28 Though ECOMOG was 
successful in restoring peace to Liberia, the argument that it had no power or 
competence to interfere in member states' internal conflicts but only in conflicts that 
break out between member countries revealed the inadequacy of ECOWAS' Treaty.29  
                                                 
27  The gradual approach to integration taken by ECOWAS was a copy of or a reflection of the same 
stance by the generality of African states. When the idea of the African Economic Community 
was first mooted, the Monrovia Block of African states, which favoured gradual integration, 
triumphed over the Casablanca Bloc, which favoured pan Africanism or a comprehensive Union 
of African states. Professor Adebayo Adedeji from Nigeria applauded the gradual approach to 
African economic cooperation, reiterating the "merits of the geographically narrower, close 
neighbourhood approach as opposed to (an abrupt) continental all-embracing strategy". See 
Adedeji 1970 Journal of Modern African Studies 213-231.  
28  Comfort 1995 http://www.bit.ly/HdjiZV. 
29  ECOWAS Treaty. At the time of the civil war in Liberia and the intervention of ECOMOG, the two 
protocols in existence could not give the desired competence and legitimacy to ECOMOG. The 
first protocol on Non-Recourse to Aggression states that the community cannot attain its 
objectives saves in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among member 
states. It affirms the rejection of force contained in a 2(4) of the United Nations Charter (1945) 
and respect for the sovereignty of each member state. However, the protocol warns each 
member state to refrain from "committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility 
or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other member 
state." The problem with this protocol as far as the Liberian civil war was concerned is that the 
protocol does not address the issue of aggression coming from outside the community or the 
problem of civil war or internal conflict. The second protocol which relates to Mutual Assistance 
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However, the Revised Treaty rectified the defect in the legal status of ECOMOG. 
Article 58 of the Revised Treaty, entitled "Regional Security", commits the 
community "to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the 
maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region." To achieve that 
objective, member states resolved to cooperate with the community to establish and 
strengthen the "appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of 
intra-state and inter-state conflicts". 
 
In addition the Authority of Heads of State and Government now has the power to 
take decisions on "conflict prevention, management and resolution, peace keeping, 
security, humanitarian support, peace-building, the control of cross-border crime 
(and the) proliferation of small arms".30  
 
The next problem relates to the issue of the harmonisation of laws, regulations and 
procedures in the community. The harmonisation of laws is essential not only for 
trade facilitation31 but also for regional integration32 and the attainment of peace and 
security33 within the ECOWAS region. 
                                                                                                                                                        
on Defence addressed the issue of internal conflict. Aa 13 and 17 of the protocol allows for the 
creation of a community army made up of troops earmarked from national units. An attempt to 
make the protocol the basis of intervention in Liberia has been pungently punctured: "…that 
raised several issues. By August 1990, none of these institutions existed, although it was an 
integral part of the protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence. … The protocol on Mutual 
Assistance on Defence did not provide for alternative institutional arrangements for the 
independent performance of the Defence commission if the Defence Council was dysfunctional or 
nonexistent. The decision to intervene undermined the principle of unanimity that governed 
ECOWAS' decision making. What occurred in Liberia was the establishment of ad hoc institutions. 
These were the standing mediation commission and the committees of five and nine, which gave 
rise to the taking of decisions. When ECOWAS intervened in the Liberian crisis, the protocol on 
Mutual Assistance on Defence was nothing more than a policy declaration." See Aning 2000 
Africa Security Review 516.  
30  Article 6 of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Resolution, Management 
Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security (1999).  
31  Trade facilitation has been defined as "the simplification and harmonisation of international trade 
procedures". Trade procedures are described as the "activities, practices and formalities involved 
in collecting, presenting, communicating and processing data required for the movement of 
goods in international trade". See WTO Date Unknown http://www.bit.ly/11Ws5w8. Protocol 
Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Resolution, Management Resolution, Peace Keeping and 
Security (1999). 
32  Probably that is why a 100 of the Treaty of Rome (1957) mandates the harmonisation of national 
laws so as to achieve a common market. In Africa, too, some states have joined the Organisation 
for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), which was created to ensure "a secure 
legal framework for the conduct of business in Africa". It has a membership of 16 countries 
(mostly Francophone). It has unified laws in a number of areas, including company law, 
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The fifth is the insufficient political, economic and social will or perhaps the entire 
lack of it within the individual capacity of each state and within the collective 
capacity of the region to take steps to accelerate the pace of integration and thus to 
realise the goals of the founding fathers of the ECOWAS.  
 
Then there are the social and economic problems plaguing almost all the members 
of the community and creating a stumbling block for ECOWAS as a regional entity. 
The irony of the matter is that apart from the social and economic problems of the 
member states, which come to the fore as a result of their weak national economies, 
their misuse of funds, corruption, their political instability, their lack of the 
infrastructure necessary to facilitate Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and their bad 
economic policies, some social and economic problems also emerge as a result of 
the activities of the community. The major problem resulting from the activities of 
the community is the inflow of refugees into neighbouring countries and the 
attendant negative consequences.34  
 
The last problem is bad governance and the lack of legitimacy of most of the 
national governments. The Heads of States and Government of the member states 
have the highest authority in the community, but unfortunately most of them are not 
true representatives of their people. As is the tradition in Africa, some of them come 
in through rigged elections, while others come in through the barrel of a gun 
(through coups d'etat).35 How can one expect such an Authority of Heads of States 
                                                                                                                                                        
commercial sale agreements and securities, and has also created a dispute settlement system to 
resolve contractual disputes. See OHADA Legis Date Unknown http://www.bit.ly/17kV2Ak. 
33  See Abubakar "Implementing the Moratorium on Light Weapons" 47-53. He discusses obstacles 
to the harmonisation of laws and regulations in West Africa as regard the declaration of a 
moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons, which was 
signed on 31 October 1998 in Abuja Nigeria by the member states of ECOWAS. Abubakar 
"Implementing the Moratorium on Light Weapons" 50: "... it should first of all be mentioned that 
the member states of the community have an obligation to modify their legislation to bring it into 
line with the code of conduct. On the one hand, this is a general international obligation; when a 
state concludes a convention which involves bringing its laws and regulations into line, it must 
automatically undertake any necessary changes".  
34  The problem of refugees led to the problem of trafficking in children and women in the sub-
region and the uncontrolled possession of arms and ammunition.  
35  In order to stem the vicious cycle of coup d'état rampart in Africa, particularly in the region, 
ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, which was signed in 2001. 
The protocol recognises democratic election as the sole means of acceding to power, the 
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and Government to support community-oriented programmes that will be inimical to 
the interests of their unrepresentative regimes? The outcome, to the detriment of 
the community, is a reluctance to part with their national sovereignty. 
 
But it is not only unfair but also deceptive to write ECOWAS off as a failure. In spite 
of the plethora of problems make it difficult for ECOWAS to fully fulfil its aspirations, 
it has recorded some remarkable progress in some sectors. In the area of the free 
movement of persons, all ECOWAS countries as we have said before have abolished 
visas and entry requirement to the citizens of the community for visits not exceeding 
90 days. Before the establishment of ECOWAS the issue of interstate roads and 
telecommunication links between the regional states was truly problematic. Today 
there is improvement in that area, as some "trans-coastal and trans-sahelian roads" 
have been constructed. The progress in this respect can be described as follows:  
 
... the West Africa sub-region in the recent time has witnessed more tremendous 
changes through ECOWAS in its joint activities when compared with the dark 
days of the colonial/ideological affiliation, language barrier, poor 
telecommunications and erratic transportation that not only pitted the countries 
in opposite direction but also foreclosed future activities that would yield 
economic, political and security cooperation and integration of the West African 
countries.36  
 
It is ironic that ECOWAS, which is primarily an economic union, has achieved most in 
the area of the maintenance of peace and security. ECOWAS (through ECOMOG) 
restored peace to Liberia and Guinea Bissau, and t used sanctions to force President 
Faure Gnassingbe to step down37 as the President of Togo and allow an election to 
be conducted (which eventually brought him back). In fact, despite articles 52 and 
53 of the United Nations Charter,38 when ECOMOG troops invaded Sierra Leone and 
                                                                                                                                                        
freedom to set up political parties, and the right of political parties to demand a system of public 
funding and freedom of association, among other things.  
36  Jide The Guardian (Nig) 14.  
37  President Faure Gnassingbe was installed by the military immediately after the death of his 
father as the president of Togo. But in response to the protest from ECOWAS, the African Union 
and international bodies he was forced to step down. See Panapress 2005 
http://www.bit.ly/192Q4MG. 
38  Article 52 of the United Nations Charter (1945) permits regional organisations to be involved in 
the maintenance of international peace and security, but a 53 imposes a pre-condition that "no 
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without 
the authorisation of the security council."  
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reinstated president Kabbah of Sierra Leone, a democratically elected president who 
was ousted from power on 25 May 1997, the Security Council of the United Nations 
Organisation (UNO) adopted Resolution 1156 (1998) on 16 March 1998 to welcome 
"the return to Sierra Leone of its democratically elected president".39 The solidarity 
shown by the Security Council amounts to an approval of the role of ECOWAS in 
maintaining peace in the region.40  
 
Similarly, in the area of institutional capacity building ECOWAS has undergone 
significant transformation since its creation. It has established "a $500m cross-
border pipeline project (WAGP) that will transport natural gas from Nigeria to three 
other ECOWAS countries - Ghana, Togo and Benin".41 In the process of transforming 
the ECOWAS Parliament from a mere advisory body to a functioning one capable of 
fulfilling its roles in realising the overall objectives of the organisation, the ECOWAS 
Treaty  was amended.42 A regional bank known as ECOBANK was established in 
1985 and it has grown sufficiently strong to have branches in almost all the states of 
the Community.43 The Community Court of Justice was established in 2001 and it 
has undergone a transformation with the amendment of its enabling Protocol, as a 
consequence of which the citizens of the community now have access to the court.44 
The formation of the West Africa Health Organisation (WAHO) in 1987, which 
became operational in 2000, was a great success in harmonising health policies 
within the Community by merging the pre-existing Anglophone and Francophone 
health institutions.45 The list of successes is long. 
 
However, that ECOWAS has problems,46 as described earlier, is obvious, but the 
truth is that the organisation is responsible for some outstanding achievements 
                                                 
39  See Dakas "Responsibility for International War Crimes". 
40  Note that ECOWAS did not obtain permission from the Security Council. 
41  Bensah 2012 http://www.bit.ly/IpRzpK. 
42  See a 4(2) of the Supplementary Protocol. 
43  Bensah 2012 http://www.bit.ly/IpRzpK. 
44  See a 9 of the Amended Protocol of the Jurisdiction of the Court (2005). 
45 For further studies see WAHO 2013 http://www.bit.ly/12LOzuU. 
46  For a further study of the structural problems of ECOWAS see Kufuor Institutional 
Transformation 24-31. 
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despite the problems. If the problems were to be solved ECOWAS would be on the 
road to achieving the vision of its founding fathers.  
 
3 From community to commission – a path to supranational status 
 
We have described the problems that must be addressed if the challenges that 
continue to impede growth and development in West Africa are to be surmounted. 
 
It seems that the root of the problems lies in the structure of the Community, which 
is too weak and moribund to face the new challenges of globalisation and to fulfil 
the aspirations and objectives of the Community.47  
 
Oghogbo48 explains the need for a new structure as follows: 
 
When a sub-regional group reaches a point where its set-up no longer allows it 
to meet the aspirations of its founding fathers or even the simplest of integration 
tasks, then it must be at dangerous crossroads and could be in dire need of re-
invention. 
 
Hounkpati, the Deputy Executive Secretary of ECOWAS for policy harmonisation, 
agreed with that assertion when he said that the current structure of the regional 
body cannot fulfil the demands of the sub-region, adding that the structure can no 
longer carry out the integration process and the expansion of programmes that the 
community has proposed.49 For him, the restructuring was necessitated by the 
expansion of the community's programmes, which required too much of the office of 
the Executive Secretary. The community needed to move from economic integration 
to political integration.50 
 
The truth is that the new structure would ease problem of the ratification and 
implementation of protocols, as the regional body would be given sufficient power to 
                                                 
47  In fact the Committee of Eminent Persons admitted that ECOWAS' structural organs were too 
weak to make credible impacts in the community and recommended the establishment of a new 
supranational structure.  
48  Oghogbo The Guardian (Nig) 4 April 16.  
49  Elkanah Daily Trust (Nig) 10. 
50  Elkanah Daily Trust (Nig) 10. 
JO LOKULO-SODIPE AND AJ OSUNTOGUN  PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
 
267 / 392 
facilitate quick decision-making. This has become essential because when ECOWAS 
was founded, globalisation had not advanced to a supranational level. What 
obtained was cooperation at intergovernmental level, whereby states came together 
to address common issue, pooling their resources and skill to confront common 
problems without surrendering their sovereignty to a body which had been formed 
to implement their decisions. However, the situation has changed. Globalisation has 
taught us the limit of the principle of non-intervention in solving the problems of 
states and has presented us perhaps with the need for a supranational institution in 
a vast world which is becoming a global village. We shall discuss the justification or 
otherwise of the establishment of a supranational entity in the next section. 
 
To reflect the growing trends in the international scene, the ECOWAS summit in 
December 2006 revolutionised the structure of ECOWAS by making it a 
supranational entity. The Executive Secretariat was re-designated as a quasi-
independent commission headed by a President, with a Vice President and seven 
Commissioners.51 The then General Secretary of ECOWAS, Chambas, from Ghana, 
retained the headship of the organisation as the President of the commission. Other 
posts were shared between other member states.  
 
Burkina Faso was awarded the position of Vice President; Sierra Leone received the 
position of the Commissioner for Trade, Customs, Industry and the Free Movement 
of Persons. Niger was given the position of the Commissioner for Agriculture, 
Environmental and Water Resources, Togo got Infrastructure, Cote'd'Ivoire got 
Macro-economic Policy, Mali got Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Senegal got 
Human Development and Gender, and Nigeria was granted the position of 
Commissioner for Administration and Finance.52 According to the President,53 the 
                                                 
51  Oghogbo The Guardian (Nig) 4 April 16. 
52  Oghogbo The Guardian (Nig) 4 April 16. 
53  The then President of the Commission, Chambas, said: "the commission entails a certain level of 
ceding of powers by member states to the president and the commission so that we are in a 
position to take decisions that will involve member states and at the same time to enable us to 
implement decisions that we will all have faith in together." See Oghogho The Guardian (Nig) 31 
July 17. See also The ECOWAS Commission 2013 http://www.bit.ly/13HDChd: "By becoming a 
commission with enhanced powers and commissioners in charge of smaller and clearly defined 
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commission now has enhanced powers and capacity, technically, financially and 
legally, which make it possible to take decisions quickly.  
 
The main features54 of the commission are: 
 
(a) A structure consisting of a President, a Vice President and seven 
Commissioners. 
(b) Smaller and more clearly defined sectors for all Commissioners, who have 
the power to take binding decisions for the member states.  
(c) Support offered to member states to build their capacities for programme 
implementation. 
(d) A predictable rotation system based on equity, transparency and 
functionality. 
 
Before the new structure was introduced, as we have said before, the principal 
instruments of law making were protocols and conventions. There was often an 
inordinate delay in their implementation due to the lengthy parliamentary ratification 
processes entailed by the system.55  
 
The new structure de-emphasises the adoption of conventions and protocols and 
invokes the principle of supranational decision making as an alternative to 
ratification.56 Instead of protocols there will be Acts and decisions which will be 
directly applicable in member states.57  
 
Consequently, "Community Acts will be Supplementary Acts, Regulations, Directives, 
Decisions, Recommendations and Opinions".58 The purpose of the Supplementary 
                                                                                                                                                        
sectors, the ECOWAS secretariat will have more impact and become more visible in member 
states". 
54  See ECOWAS 2013 http://www.bit.ly/3mLrD7.  
55  The ECOWAS Commission 2013 http://www.bit.ly/13HDChd: "… decision of the authority were 
however immediately applicable and binding on Member States, whilst those emanating from the 
council of ministers were only applicable and binding on the Community Institutions."  
56 See The ECOWAS Commission 2013 http://www.bit.ly/13HDChd. 
57  The ECOWAS Commission 2013 http://www.bit.ly/13HDChd. 
58  The ECOWAS Commission 2013 http://www.bit.ly/13HDChd. 
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Acts will be to make the treaty complete, and once that is done they (the 
Supplementary Acts) will be binding on every member state and the institution of 
the community.59 The Council of Ministers will enact Regulations and Directives and 
make Decisions and Recommendations.60 Regulations will be generally applied and 
their provisions will be directly enforceable in member states and institutions of the 
community while decisions and directives will be enforceable in all member states 
according to their terms.61 The commission will make Rules for the purpose of 
implementing the acts enacted by the Council. These Rules will have the same legal 
status as the acts enacted by Council but the commission's recommendations and 
advice to the Council will not be not enforceable.62  
 
The restructuring, as we earlier, also includes the ECOWAS parliament. The citizens 
of the Community will be eligible to competentest for parliamentary positions and if 
they emerge as winners they will have the power to propose legislative acts which, if 
adopted by the other organs of the Community, will become community law.63  
 
The ECOWAS Court of Justice will go through a similar restructuring. The judicial 
function of the court will be separated from the administrative function. 
Consequently an appellate court64 and an ECOWAS Judicial Council comprised of the 
Chief Justices of the 15 member states will be established with the function of 
recruiting judges to the Community Courts (the Court of Justice and the Appellate 
Court, if it is created).65 In addition, article 2466 would fast-track the enforcement of 
Community Court judgments by making provision for the appointment of a national 
authority by member states to execute the judgments of the court applicable to their 
                                                 
59  The ECOWAS Commission 2013 http://www.bit.ly/13HDChd.  
60  The ECOWAS Commission 2013 http://www.bit.ly/13HDChd. 
61  The ECOWAS Commission 2013 http://www.bit.ly/13HDChd. 
62  The ECOWAS Commission 2013 http://www.bit.ly/13HDChd. 
63  As a result of the study instituted by the ECOWAS Parliament, a document entitled "A Case for 
the Enhancement of Power of the ECOWAS Parliament" was presented to the President of the 
ECOWAS Commission, Ouedraogo. If the document is adopted and the Preliminary Draft 
Supplementary Act drafted by the Parliament is also adopted by the institutions of the ECOWAS 
Community, the issues of the Electoral College and real parliamentary duties for the ECOWAS 
Parliament would be settled. See Cooljoe 2012 http://www.bit.ly/Tl99Qk. 
64  The Council of Ministers at its Fifty-sixth Ordinary Session held at Abuja between 12-13 June 
2006 directed the Commission to establish an Appellate Court. 
65  Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa 2013 http://bit.ly/145HifV.  
66  See Supplementary Protocol A/P1/7/91 (2005). 
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states. If the issue of the independence of the members of such an authority is 
guaranteed and men of integrity are appointed, the problem of the enforcement of 
the Community Court's judgments may be a thing of the past.  
 
In the area of finance, the lofty idea of a common currency called the "ECO" for the 
region has not yet been abandoned, despite the failure of the Community to 
commence it as scheduled.67 A new date of 2020 has been fixed as the 
commencement date.68 Having a single currency in the region would facilitate trade 
and boost the economies of member states, but there are some conditions69 to be 
fulfilled before such a unified financial regime of that magnitude can commence. In 
that regard the delay is understandable. Concerted efforts need to be devoted to 
meeting the requirements for the implementation of this proposal. 
 
Be that as it may, the consequences of the restructuring process as enumerated by 
the commission are "the consolidation of the community spirit", "the enhancement 
of the powers of the commission", "the strengthening of supra nationality" and the 
adoption of a new legal regime in member states and by the community's 
institutions.70 
 
The change from an ECOWAS secretariat into a commission is not merely a change 
of nomenclature. It would be wanton ignorance to describe it as such. The 
international community recognises it as a real change, and as marking a change in 
the nature of ECOWAS itself. Consequently, many countries are now establishing 
permanent missions with ECOWAS71in order to facilitate trade and economic 
cooperation between their countries and ECOWAS. The fact that some countries are 
                                                 
67  The common currency was planned to become operational in 2005 but the date was shifted to 
2009. 
68 See African Manager 2013 http://www.bit.ly/1bRm2MS.  
69  For those conditions, see This Day Live 2012 http://www.bit.ly/172qq4z. 
70 See ECOWAS Commission 2007 http://www.bit.ly/1c39tg1. 
71  See Cedeao ECOWAS 2013 http://www.bit.ly/12LPQ5g. 
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establishing permanent missions with ECOWAS is a testimony to its new 
supranational status.72  
 
We think it would be appropriate to conclude this section with a statement made by 
Diop,73 the ECOWAS Director of Communications, on the topic of the new structure: 
 
For us, the coming on board of the commission means everything. It means 
simply that the implementation machinery of ECOWAS has now been 
empowered. Before today, there were bottlenecks that could be frustrating. 
When people complain about the slow pace of the implementation of protocols, 
they were overlooking the fact that the old secretariat could not move without 
having to go lengths to consult and get approvals.  
 
4 The focus on supra-nationality: any benefits at all? 
 
Supra-nationality occurs not when states come together to form an international 
organisation which is subject to their control but when states surrender part of their 
sovereignty to such an organisation to the extent that the organisation created by 
them is able to control them in the areas of its mandate. It is an ironic situation in 
which a creature (the international organisation) is more powerful in some respects 
than its creator (the states).  
 
The surrender of power, whether partial or complete, to an international 
organisation is not an easy task. This is because it is difficult for a state to surrender 
part of its sovereignty, which is an essential attribute of a state. For the purpose of 
definition sovereignty can be considered in two contexts. The first of these is legal 
sovereignty and the second is Westphalian sovereignty.  
 
Legal sovereignty involves "jurisdiction independence and [the] equality of states".74 
Westphalian sovereignty refers to a situation where a country does not take orders 
from outside or from any other authority. The country is independent in the sense 
                                                 
72  The establishment of permanent missions with international organisations started with the 
League of Nations. But the move was boosted later by the emergence of supra international 
institutions like World Bank, the World Trade Organisation etc.  
73  Oghogho The Guardian (Nig) 4 April 16. 
74  Meltzer 2005 U Pa J Int'l Econ L 10-15. 
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that it is not subject to any external control. Consequently, if a state surrenders part 
of her sovereignty to an international organisation which starts to control it in any 
form, the Westphalian concept of sovereignty is impinged upon.  
 
It is difficult to see why a country would consent to surrender even part of its 
sovereignty, particularly in the case of West African states, most of which fought 
bloody wars for years to gain their independence – their sovereignty. Why would 
they discard what they fought for, even if it is only a fiction? Evers75 saw little sense 
in such a move:  
 
Has the nation state become outmoded? Have the victories of sovereignty that 
so many wars have been fought over and are still being fought over-been the 
death of precisely this ... same sovereignty? If so, then who or what will succeed 
it as the decision-making authority and the principle of order? 
 
Evers failed to answer the question himself, though he admitted that the concept of 
sovereignty is losing its meaning in a world which is being bound together by 
globalisation. He76 wrote:  
 
This sovereignty is now being emptied of its previous meaning on the smaller 
and the larger scale by the rapid course taken by the interlinked societies. The 
dialectic relationship between the rapid globalization of the economy, 
communications and culture and the simultaneous more and more complex and 
subtle formation of different social spheres actually makes the idea of a central 
decision-making body seem an anachronism, though nobody doubts that the 
nation state as an important level of action – perhaps the most important – will 
continue to exist for a long time to come. It is, however, losing its claim to 
exclusivity, which, by the way, it never did comply with even in the Anglo-
European World of States. 
 
According to Raustiala77 the question is "Why (do) NATO, the WTO, the UN and the 
many other international organisations that populate New York, Geneva and 
elsewhere [exist]?" "Rational choice institutionalism" is an answer that is "distinctly 
functional, bordering on the tautological". States delegate authority to supranational 
                                                 
75  Tilman 1995 Law and State 31. 
76  Tilman 1995 Law and State 32-33. This is part of a discussion of governance in the European 
Union, which is a good example of a supranational organisation.  
77  Raustiala 2006 Ga J In't & Comp Law 429. 
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institutions because the anticipated benefits of doing so outweigh the expected 
costs.78  
 
What states gain from international organisations, whether supranational or not, has 
been so difficult to perceive by the citizens of the states which are members of such 
organisations. Ignorance of the value or perhaps lack of value of these international 
organisations is very common in African countries, where even the elites do not see 
the need for them. The President of the Nigeria Bar Association (the NBA),79 
Agbakoba, a legal luminary and Senior Advocate of Nigeria80 decried Nigeria's 
membership of international organisations because, according to him, Nigeria as a 
country does not benefit from them:  
 
The NBA being a professional body that understands how multilateral institutions 
work, I want to ask, what has Nigeria benefited from being a member of the 
commonwealth? What has Nigeria benefited from being a member of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) the United Nation 
Organization (UNO) the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) or do we need 
new institution [to benefit us].
81
  
 
At this juncture our intention is to discuss the benefits and the disadvantages of the 
existence of supranational organisations. The first benefit is that it is an effective 
institution for the maintenance of peace and a provider of welfare to the citizens of 
member states. Functionalism and neo-functionalism postulate that when states lose 
their "attributes of sovereignty" they "acquire new techniques for resolving conflicts 
between themselves based on a consensus to settle difference by peaceful 
means."82 Earnest Haas83 explains it in another way, saying that, "Supranationality 
                                                 
78  Tallberg 2002 West European Politics 25. 
79  The Nigeria Bar Association is the only association of legal practitioners in Nigeria. 
80  A Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) is the equivalent of a Queen's Counsel (QC) in the United 
Kingdom. 
81  Unachukwu 2008 http://www.bit.ly/16eo6br. Agbakoba's statement is his own personal opinion 
and not that of the Nigeria Bar Association. A day before he made his statement the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs in Nigeria, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, commended the roles of Nigeria in world affairs 
when he said "Nigeria's foreign policies have been well-managed over the years to the extent 
that the country has been projected as a global player and applauded by the international 
community."  
82  Burton "Functionalism and the Resolution of Conflict" 240. 
83  He was quoted in a paper by Onwuka "Role of ECOWAS" 375.  
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symbolises the victory of economics over politics … the supremacy of welfare 
dominated policies is assured."  
 
We have already explained the role of ECOWAS through ECOMOG in maintaining 
peace in West Africa. The criticism that greeted its establishment has also been 
explained. The fact is that ECOWAS was the only institution that could legitimately 
and successfully perform that task.  
 
The second benefit depends on the objective of the international organisation 
involved. If the objective is to attain economic or political integration, such an 
organisation must embrace a supranational status. Hartog84 argues that "as a matter 
of fact, integration is usually connected with the transfer of a part of national 
sovereignty to supranational agencies". The European Union is a supranational 
institution. Its move towards the supranational began to evolve in May 1950 when 
the adoption of the proposal of the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, led to 
the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (the ECSC), whose 
mandate was to create a common market in the sector without any form of trade 
barrier.85  
 
Thirdly, a supranational institution is in a position to strengthen national 
governments by helping them to solve their problems. Fukuyama86 seems to be 
talking about this when he writes: "For the past –September 11th period, the chief 
issue for global politics will not be how to cut back on stateness but how to build it 
up." Weak nations can be helped by strong nations, that is philanthropic but it is the 
responsibility of supranational institution to do that as a matter of duty".  
 
                                                 
84  Hartog 1953 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 165. 
85  To consolidate their gains from the Common European Market, European Governments later 
extended their delegation of power to the European community as they signed the Maastricht 
Treaty of the European Union (1992), which boosted the supranational status of the European 
Union.  
86  Fukuyama State Building 120. 
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Another benefit is that of "backstopping"87 the national governments. States used to 
help one another in this area before the advent of international institutions. Hugo 
Grotius88 explained the position in 1625 when he said:  
 
The state where the convicted offender lives or has taken shelter, should upon 
application being made to it, either punish the demanded person according to 
his demerits or else deliver him up to be treated at the discretion of the injured 
party.  
 
International institutions are better positioned to take up this responsibility, 
particularly if they are supranational.  
 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute, which established the international criminal court, 
provides that a case cannot be prosecuted by the court if "the case is being 
investigated or prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction over it, unless the state 
is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution."89 This 
means that the international court can backstop national governments only if they 
fail to try criminal offenders in their territory or if there are good grounds for 
thinking that their trial may not be genuine. We cannot exhaust the benefits arising 
from supranational institutions. Suffice it to say that they provide collective solutions 
to common and particular problems that affect states.  
 
On the other hand, certain problems have emerged with the advent of supranational 
institutions. Slaughter and Burke-White90 point out that one of the dangers of using 
international law to shape and influence domestic politics is that: 
 
a repressive regime is able to use compulsion at the international level as a 
cover or an excuse to undertake its own domestic policies that may undermine 
legitimate opposition groups and violate citizens' rights. 
 
                                                 
87  Backstopping is a process whereby some states prosecute an accused person for crime because 
the states that are supposed to prosecute the offender failed to do so or is incapable of doing so.  
88  Hugo Rights of War and Peace 1062.  
89  For examples of international institutions that fit into this category see Slaughter and Burke-
White 2006 Harv Int'l LJ 327.  
90  Slaughter and Burke-White 2006 Harv Int'l LJ 327. 
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Robinson,91 the former UN Commissioner for Human Rights, was specific on the 
issue: "Repressive new laws and detention practices have been introduced in a 
significant number of countries, all broadly justified by the new international war on 
terrorism."  
 
The second problem arises when supranational institutions pursue their own 
interests. Tallberg92 explains this problem in relation to the European Union when he 
says: 
 
Delegation is likely to result in both desired and undesired effects … the 
undesired effects (occur) … when supranational institutions succeed in pursuing 
their own interests … . 
 
The point here is that supranational institutions may become so powerful that they 
can go beyond their mandates and pursue other interests, which might be 
detrimental to the interests of the national governments of their member states or 
their citizens.  
 
Or problems might emerge as a result of the activities of supranational institutions. 
For example, the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of persons, residence and 
establishment has led to an increase in prostitution, child labour, child trafficking, 
the commission of crimes and the exploitation of the citizens of the community by 
employers in the host countries. Ijalaiye93 explains how this exploitation is being 
perpetuated when he says that: 
 
there is an apparent conspiracy between the immigration officers or those 
charged with the implementation of the expatriate quota and the illegal aliens. 
This ultimately results in the exploitation of the latter's labour without just 
remuneration by the citizens of the host country. 
 
                                                 
91  Robinson 2003 Am U Int'l L Rev 12. 
92  Tallberg 2002 West European Politics 25. 
93 Ijalaye "African Economic Community Treaty" 27. 
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And problems of the harmonisation of laws, cross-border insecurity and the 
proliferation of weapons have emerged as a result of the fraternity between 
neighbouring nations in West Africa.  
 
A fourth problem is the financial situation of the supranational institutions. States 
whose economy is weak may find it difficult to discharge their financial obligations to 
supranational institutions.  
 
The last problem we shall briefly mention is the low level of loyalty to supranational 
institutions. Citizens are more committed to their nation states than to the 
community or the union. For example, Nigerians could not see any justifiable reason 
why Nigeria should be spending her oil money to guide the course of other nations 
while except for the ruling class they themselves live in abject poverty.94  
 
5 Supranationalism: Can the economic community of West African 
states attain the status? 
 
The essence of the 1993 Revised Treaty was to move ECOWAS from the 
"developmental regionalism of the past" to the "new regionalism of the 
contemporary era".95 The CEP recommended the establishment of a supranational 
organisation using the EU as a yardstick. The question is whether or not the EU type 
of supranationalism could work in West Africa. It has been noted that unlike 
ECOWAS, which deliberately opted for supranationalism, the emergence of a 
supranational organisation in Europe was an "involuntary act."96 
 
It is essential for us to examine the reasons that informed the CEP's 
recommendations. In the first instance, it was obvious that the CEP presumed that 
the wave of globalisation was spreading throughout the region of West Africa, and 
                                                 
94  Nigeria played a leading role in the formation of ECOWAS, a leading role in setting up and 
financing ECOMOG, a leading role in the activities of ECOWAS generally, and in the African 
union.  
95  Kufuor Institutional Transformation 56. 
96  Kufuor Institutional Transformation 56. 
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wanted to consolidate that gain. It recommended that ECOWAS should become a 
supranational organisation.97  
 
Kufuor98 has rightly debunked the CEP's assumption, as there was no "sufficient 
evidence of increased integration of the respective ECOWAS economies". The 
consequence is that there is no structural foundation for supranationalism to thrive.  
 
In addition it was observed that "states' industrial commercial class"99 demanded the 
establishment of a supranational organisation in Europe to protect the capital that 
flows within the region, but there was no such demand in West Africa. Kufuor100 
argues effectively:  
 
If the EU is the yardstick, then it should be noted here that in 1996, just at the 
time when there was enthusiasm for the new ECOWAS Treaty, the volume of 
intra-EU capital flows was the equivalent of 49.3 billion ECUs. In addition, the 
CEP Report did not supply any evidence on the volume of intra-ECOWAS capital 
flows. We are thus left to speculate on how intense this was. However, if 
institutions follow cross-border capital flows, as the ordoliberals argue, it is 
instructive to note that the CIC, charged as noted earlier with an important role 
in enhancing intra-ECOWAS capital movements is yet to be constituted three 
decades after the 1975 Treaty provided for it, and more than ten years after 
such provisions were reaffirmed in the 1993 Treaty.  
 
He concludes by saying that the hypothesis that the existence of a supranational 
organisation in West Africa was essential to "manage firms" extra-territorial capital 
exposes the relatively weak foundations on which ECOWAS' supranational 
organisations have been erected.101  
 
For the same reason, despite the emergence of the new Revised Treaty of 1993, 
ECOWAS is far from being a supranational organisation. Recently, on the 22nd June 
2009, the Chairman of ECOWAS,102 at the 36th meeting of Heads of States and 
                                                 
97  Kufuor Institutional Transformation 56. 
98 Kufuor Institutional Transformation 56. 
99  Kufuor Institutional Transformation 56. 
100  Kufuor Institutional Transformation 57. 
101  Kufuor Institutional Transformation 57. 
102  See Abuja 2009 http://www.bit.ly/15JrKu4. 
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Governments, lamented the bottlenecks and constraints facing ECOWAS in 
implementing its decisions: 
 
It is sad to note that 30 years after the signing of the protocol on free 
movement of goods and services, we are yet to significantly remove the 
bottlenecks at our borders, which continue to encumber effective economic 
integration. The reality of the global economic situation today makes it critical 
for us to recommit to investing the relevant protocols with the requisite will. 
 
In any case, if supranationalism fails in West Africa, what should the alternative be? 
Should the organisation revert to intergovernmentalism as it operates in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA)? 
 
Our position is that despite the criticism of supranationalism in the European Union 
and the present unsuccessful attempt by the community (ECOWAS) to embrace it 
(supranationalism) the move towards supranationalism should not be jettisoned. 
This is because the universal problem of regional organisations is the problem of 
compliance with their decisions, and the problem can be better solved by 
supranationalism rather than by intergovernmentalism. 
 
Despite the nobility of the objectives of AFTA, it has been posited that the major 
weakness of ASEAN's decision-making process is the absence of a supranational 
organ. Horacio103 observed: 
 
ASEAN essentially has no supranational decision-making or law-making organs 
or supranational bodies it may be argued that this is the Achilles heels of ASEAN 
integration. 
 
Furthermore, NAFTA is also exhibiting some little signs that could be read to mean 
that the organisation is flirting with some notions of supranationalism. West Brook104 
examined the possibility of NAFTA's becoming a supranational organisation: 
 
                                                 
103  Horacio 1996 Sovereignty and Regionalism 1080. 
104  West Brook 2008 West Brook 2008 Tex Int'l LJ 349. 
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The political and legal structure of NAFTA is very different from that of the 
European Union. It is far less integrated at the treaty level and lacks anything 
approaching the institutional supranationalism represented by the European 
court of justice. On the other hand, the experience in Europe, beginning with the 
coal and steel communities in the early 1950s, suggests that integration 
sometimes begins with relatively small and weak steps that nevertheless teach 
valuable issues and build the necessary confidence for the development of more 
powerful institutions. 
 
Though the ASEAN Protocol105 on Dispute Settlement is similar to the dispute 
mechanism of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the possibility of ASEAN 
becoming a supranational organisation like the EU is nil.106 
 
We therefore suggest that there should be further support of the supranational 
regime as provided by the Revised 1993 Treaty, despite its initial and present 
failures. Retreat from supranationalism back to intergovernmentalism is not the 
answer to the present problems. Despite the institutional reform, the metamorphosis 
of an intergovernmental organisation into a supranational one is always gradual, and 
enough time must be allowed for its full manifestation.  
 
6 Conclusion 
 
An attempt has been made in this paper to examine the new structure of ECOWAS. 
We rationalise the need for this structure in the light of the challenges facing the 
organisation, which arise largely from the structural defects of the old regime. We 
share the view that the new structure, which aims to make ECOWAS a supranational 
entity, is essential to transforming the moribund regional institution into an effective 
one which is better positioned to attain the region's objectives. 
 
                                                 
105  See ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlements Mechanisms adopted on 29 November 
2009. 
106  One reason why ASEAN may not progress beyond a free trade area is because of the region's 
political history, which shows that there has been envy and antagonism among the member 
states, particularly between Singapore and Malaysia. See Tan and Samtani 2002 
http://www.bit.ly/18BMhDh.  
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The National Governments in Africa have failed to liberate their citizens from the 
evils of economic mismanagement, misrule and the social evils that plague the 
people.  
 
It is our position that the existence of supranational institution like European Union 
in Africa, and specifically in West Africa, could lead to such liberation and the 
restoration of hope for the region's peoples.  
 
The new structure of ECOWAS is being positioned to achieve the vision of its 
founding fathers, who believed that regional integration would promote economic 
development, engender improved standards of living for the people, enhance 
interstate relations, and contribute to the progress and development of the region.  
 
The problems of underdevelopment, political instability and bad governance in Africa 
have been a universal concern. In fact some writers have gone to the extreme in 
their comments and advocated the recolonisation of the African continent as an 
antidote to the perennial problems. Pfaff107 argues that a "Cooperative Euro-African 
trust organisation" should be established and that African countries should assign "a 
defined (an irrevocable) authority" to it for the purpose of governing them. Helman 
and Ratner108 make a case for "conservatorship" to address the problems of "newly 
non-self governing territories" with the participation of the United Nations on three 
levels, which are "governance assistance", the "delegation of certain governance 
functions", and "direct UN trusteeship".  
 
We do not subscribe to neocolonisation or any solution which will put foreigners in 
control of African governance again. The truth is that the colonial masters 
themselves contributed to the problems facing Africa today by the way they ruled 
the territories during the colonial administration.109  
 
                                                 
107  Pfaff 1995 Foreign Affairs 2. 
108  Helman and Ratner 1992-1993 Foreign Policy 3. 
109  See also Rodney How Europe Undeveloped Africa.  
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It is our contention that a strong supranational institution committed to the 
objectives of ECOWAS can correct the ills in our society and put a smile on the faces 
of the citizens of the community.  
 
The recent judgments by the ECOWAS Court of Justice are a pointer to the fact that 
the quest for a supranational entity in the region is not a wild goose chase. In Dame 
Hadijatou Mani Koraou v Republic of Niger,110 the Court awarded the sum of CFA 10 
000 000 against the Niger Republic in favour of the Applicant on the ground that the 
Republic of Niger should be held responsible for the failure of its administrative and 
judicial authorities to provide redress to the Applicant, who suffered from slavery 
and discrimination. Similarly, in SERAP v The Federal Government of Nigeria,111 the 
court held that the Government of Nigeria violated Articles 1 and 24 of the African 
Charter on Human and People's Rights and was therefore liable for human rights 
violations by the Multinational Companies in the Niger Delta. The Government was 
therefore ordered to hold the perpetrators liable, to prevent such an occurrence in 
future, and to take effective measures to salvage the damage done to the 
environment of the Niger Delta. 
 
We conclude that ECOWAS is not yet a supranational entity like the European Union, 
but there are enough signs that it may soon become one if present efforts are not 
jettisoned but improved upon. 
                                                 
110  Dame Hadijatou Mani Koraou v Republic of Niger ECW/JUD/06/08. 
111  SERAP v The Federal Government of Nigeria ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12. 
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